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PROBLEMS OF PROCEDURAL REGULARITY
IN LABOR ARBITRATION*
ROBBEN WRIGHT FLEMINGt
INTRODUCTION
Procedural irregularities have troubled arbitrators, and the parties,
from the inception of the industrial arbitration process. Such irregu-
larities may take place before, during, or after the hearing. The con-
tract may, for instance, require that before any discharge is made
effective the company must notify the union representative and discuss
the case with him. Suppose X is then caught drinking on the job and
is fired forthwith without any discussion with the union representa-
tive. What is the significance of the contractual requirement that
there be notice before discharge? Or suppose that the contract re-
quires that job vacancies be posted and that the senior man be given
the job provided he has the qualifications. The company then fills the
job without considering the senior man, though on subsequent in-
vestigation it turns out that the senior man did not have the qualifica-
tions. What then? Shortly after reporting for work X is accused by
his foreman of being under the influence of alcohol. Hot words are
exchanged and X is sent home for the day. The grievance is processed
on the question of whether X was, or was not, drunk. At the arbitra-
tion hearing, however, the company switches its theory to insubordi-
nation. Putting aside the question of the union's preparation to meet
the charge of insubordination, is this an issue which may be injected
into the hearing at the arbitration level when it has not been discussed
during the course of the grievance sessions? A similar question arises
when one side or the other chooses, for whatever reason, to conceal
and withhold either the testimony of a key witness or the existence
of a key document until the arbitration hearing. Is the question which
arises then simply one of surprise, in which case it can perhaps be
remedied by giving the other party adequate opportunity to investi-
gate and answer the unanticipated evidence, or does it run deeper
than that and go to the very admissibility of such evidence when it
has not previously been made available?
Finally, there is the post-hearing stage at which at least two pro-
cedural problems can, and often do, arise. One or both of the briefs
may contain a new argument which has not previously been made,
* This article grew out of a study financed by the Labor Project of the Fund
for the Republic. Interviews with many arbitrators were included in the study.
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
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though based on evidence in the record. If the argument is likely to
be decisive, what opportunity, if any, should the other party be given
to respond to it? In the alternative, suppose the arbitrator finds a new
clause in the contract which the parties have not argued, but which he
deems controlling. May the arbitrator decide the case on the basis of
the clause without further reference to the parties, or must he ask
their views before proceeding in this fashion? Will he be accused by
the parties of arbitral feather-bedding if he prolongs the case by ask-
ing for their comments on the new clause? Will he be accused of
applying a clause which neither of them thought to be applicable if
he does not? If he ignores the clause and sticks strictly to the argu-
ments which the parties have made, will he have fulfilled the proper
function of an arbitrator?
These are difficult questions on which arbitrators themselves hold
widely varying opinions. Moreover, such questions involve problems
of fair procedure, without which industrial arbitration cannot hope to
achieve stature and respect, and problems of industrial relations
policy. With the former all arbitrators are certainly concerned. The
degree to which they should concern themselves with "good" indus-
trial relations policy will be more debatable, both among arbitrators
and the parties.
With this much of an introduction we may now turn to a more care-
ful examination of the problems which arise, the ways in which arbi-
trators have chosen to deal with them, and some of the policy con-
siderations which are involved.
I. THE PRE-HEARING STAGE
Many collective bargaining contracts contain clauses which impose
upon the parties a prescribed procedure. Thus there are time limita-
tions which apply to processing the grievance at various steps in the
procedure, necessity of notice to the union with an opportunity for
discussion in the event of discipline or discharge, requirements of
advance notice of layoff in cases of layoff, and provisions that senior
employees may be entitled to first consideration on promotion pro-
vided they have the qualifications.1 The reason for such contractual
rules and limitations is not hard to find. The very purpose of the
collective bargaining contract, as the late Sumner Slichter so often
pointed out,2 is to introduce an orderly system of self-government
within the plant. Arbitrators have sometimes referred to such rules
1. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Basic Patterns in Union Contracts
(5th ed. 1961).
2. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management 1 (1941).
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as rudimentary requirements of industrial due process. 3 And while it
may be true that it is often the union which seeks contractual limita-
tions on the unbridled authority of management, it is not to be
supposed that there is no value to management in some of the limita-
tions. Advance discussion of a disciplinary penalty often discloses
facts which affect the propriety of the penalty and give the parties an
opportunity to discuss the underlying problem, of which the rule
infraction may only have been a manifestation.4
For our purpose it is not necessary to run the entire gamut of
contractual rules in order to understand the problems which are
raised for the arbitrator by procedural violations. Three areas-
discipline and discharge, layoffs, and promotions-will suffice to il-
lustrate the point.
A. Discipline and Discharge
Contracts frequently include a provision which requires the com-
pany, before imposing disciplinary measures or discharge, to notify
the union, give the employee a written statement of the charges, and
/or hold a hearing at which the employee and a union representative
are present. When such procedural requirements are violated and
the case ends up in arbitration, the question naturally arises as to the
effect of the rule violation. A review of the reported cases indicates
that the following conclusions may be drawn on this question:
1. All arbitrators attach importance to the contractual require-
ment. Some arbitrators have even held that where past practice
included prior notification of discharge such practice has become a
part of the contract even though no express written provision is
contained therein.5
2. Some arbitrators conclude that failure to follow the contractual
procedure nullifies the entire action.6
3. Most arbitrators conclude that failure to comply with a con-
tractual procedure will affect the degree of penalty which is appro-
priate, but not necessarily vitiate the action in its entirety.7
4. There are occasional cases which suggest that failure to comply
with the contractual procedure will not necessarily affect the penalty
at all.,
5. There are more reported cases of procedural defects in discipline
3. Bendix-Westinghouse Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 466 (1959).
4. Fleming & Witte, Grievances under the Collective Agreement, Unions and
Union Leadership 226 (Barbash ed. 1959).
5. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 197 (1947).
6. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 177 (1952).
7. E.g., Kohler Brothers Sand & Gravel Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 903 (1956).
8. E.g., Columbian Rope Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 450, 455-56 (1947).
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and discharge in the early reports than in recent years. This suggests
that if such clauses still exist in contracts, and it is common knowledge
that they do, past arbitration decisions have caused the parties to be
more careful in complying with them.
To satisfactorily document these conclusions one needs to go into a
little more detail. Even when arbitrators have said that the penalty
may stand despite irregularity in following the contractual procedure,
they have not discounted the importance of the procedure. Thus one
arbitrator thought that it was appropriate to discharge a bus driver
with a bad safety record even though the employer had failed to file
written charges against the driver as required by the contract. But
the result was justified on the ground that the safety factor was too
significant to be overlooked despite the admitted procedural defect.0
It is, of course, noteworthy that in such a case there is a third inter-
est involved-that of the riding public. In another case the arbitrator
held that failure to issue a written reprimand, as required by the
contract, did not affect the discharge because the union had ac-
quiesced in the irregularity. 0 In another case the arbitrator held
that a discharge could stand where the company had failed to give the
employee his contractual right to talk to his steward before leaving
company premises. However, in this case the union apparently did
not argue that violation of the contractual procedure should nullify
the discharge.1 And in a case where the majority reinstated a man
who had been discharged without the union having an opportunity
to offer evidence in accordance with the contractual requirement
that no one be discharged without an investigation, the minority dis-
sented vigorously on the ground that previous decisions had held that
procedural defects were harmless where the "employee voluntarily
acknowledges the commission of an offense charged and is assessed a
measure of discipline which is fair in relation to the offense com-
mitted .. ."12 Finally, in a railroad case in which the employee's
contractual rights had been violated in that his chosen representative
was not present at the interrogation of a certain witness, the arbi-
trator held that the testimony of this witness would have to be
ignored, but that the employer's case could stand without it.13
Despite the importance which arbitrators have assigned to compli-
ance with contractual procedures, not many of them have held that
9. Hudson County Bus Owners Ass'n, 3 Lab. Arb. 786 (1946).
10. Schwayder Bros., Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. 552 (1947).
11. Douglas Aircraft Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 716 (1952).
12. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 29 Lab. Arb. 409, 411 (1957).
13. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and N.Y. Central R.R. Co. (Eastern
District, Boston and. Albany Division), Special Board of Adjustment No. 289,
Award No. 8, Claim No. 2 (1959).
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irregularities of this type will completely negate the action which has
been taken. There are a few decisions of this kind,'1 4 but sometimes
the language of the contract is very precise, as in the case in which
the contract provided that no discharge should be effective prior to the
ruling of the Impartial Chairman and the company then discharged
the individual in advance of such a ruling.15 In the overwhelming
number of the cases arbitrators have taken the rule violation into con-
sideration with respect to the penalty, but have not declared the entire
action a nullity. Doubtless the exact nature of the award in these
cases is affected by the facts of the particular case, and it is difficult
to generalize. There are discharge cases in which the employer failed
to consult the union in advance;16 the employer failed to give the
employee a statement of the reason for his termination ;17 the
warning procedure was ignored ;1- and the employer fired a man in
violation of the provision that no discharge could be effected without
approval of the arbitrator except in case of theft.19 The employee was
reinstated but denied part or all of his back pay because the arbitra-
tor concluded that the offense had, in fact, been committed, but the
procedure had been violated. Conversely, there are cases in which the
company failed to give the union prompt notification of the dis-
missal ;20 the discharged employee was refused permission to call a
foreman to the grievance hearing despite the contractual guarantee
that the employee could call anyone who could shed light on the
grievance ;21 the employer failed to file the required written com-
plaint ;22 employees were summarily discharged without the requisite
hearing in the presence of union representatives ;23 and the discharge
was sustained but the employees given back pay from the date of the
discharge to the date of the award or some other appropriate date. In
other cases the discharge of an employee for insubordination was
commuted to a five day layoff because, among other reasons, the
employer had failed to follow the contractual requirement that he
notify the union of the discharge ;24 and discharged employees were
given an additional two weeks pay because the employer violated the
contractual requirement that two weeks prior notice be given of a
14. See, e.g., Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 177 (1952).
15. Modernage Furniture Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 220 (1946).
16. Hayes Mfg. Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 412 (1951).
17. Die Tool & Eng'r Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 156 (1946).
18. Cedartown Textiles, Inc., 8 Lab. Arb. 360 (1947).
19. Lou Seidman & Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 653 (1948).
20. National Lead Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 28 (1949).
21. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 317 (1947).
22. Schreider Trucking Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 430 (1946).
23. Torrington Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 35 (1945).
24. Ranney Refrigerator Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 621 (1946).
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contemplated discharge even though the employees were given two
weeks pay at the time of discharge.2 5
Viewed from a purely theoretical standpoint one would suppose
arbitrators could take at least three positions in discipline and dis-
charge cases in which there are procedural defects: (1) that unless
there is strict compliance with the procedural requirements the whole
action will be nullified; (2) that the requirements are of significance
only where the employee can show that he has been prejudiced by
failure to comply therewith; or (3) that the requirements are im-
portant, and that any failure to comply will be penalized, but that
the action taken is not thereby rendered null and void. The first of
these positions would seem to be generally undesirable for a number
of reasons. The procedural irregularity may not have been prejudi-
cial in any sense of the word, the emphasis upon technicalities would
be inconsistent with the informal atmosphere of the arbitration proc-
ess, and the end result could on many occasions be quite ludicrous.
If, for instance, an employee gets drunk on the job and starts smash-
ing valuable machinery with a sledge hammer, it would hardly seem
appropriate to nullify his discharge on the sole ground 'that it was in
violation of a contractual requirement that the union be given ad-
vance notice. The second position has considerable merit in that it
focuses on what is, after all, the significant point. Granted there has
been a failure to comply with the procedure required by the contract,
has this dereliction in any way prejudiced the employee? If he can
show that it has, he has then obviously been deprived of a fair op-
portunity to present his side of the grievance and the past action
should be set aside. There is, nevertheless, a defect in this approach.
It tends to minimize the importance of a regularized procedure in a
matter of considerable importance to both the company and the
union, and to place a premium on value judgments as to
when action will result in prejudice to the individual and when it
will not. In the clear case this may make no difference, but in the
marginal situation it may change the whole result. It is a recognized
fact in all human negotiations that it is easier to modify a proposed
action before it is taken than afterwards. Thus where a reason for
requiring by contract that the company discuss a discharge with the
union before effectuating it is to give the union an opportunity to
forestall the action and persuade the company that some lesser
penalty might better serve the purpose, it may be hard to prove that
the employee has been prejudiced by failure to comply with the
procedure, but certainly his situation is psychologically quite differ-
ent. The third approach, which is the one most arbitrators have
25. New York Tribune, Inc., 8 Lab. Arb. 410 (1947).
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taken, has the virtue of penalizing failure to comply with the contrac-
tual procedure, thereby encouraging compliance with it, but not
necessarily obviating all that has been done. The decision may, on
occasion, quite outrage one of the parties. When a company has
discharged an employee for an offense which everyone can concede
is worthy of discharge, it may be shocked to be told that it must
nevertheless pay the culprit his wages between the time of the dis-
charge and the date of the arbitration award because it failed to
follow the procedural requirements of the contract. This sense of
outrage will hardly prevent the company from making sure the next
time that the contract is followed. Is this a bad result? The steady
decline in reported cases involving procedural defects suggests that
such arbitration decisions may have been influential in persuading
the parties that rules, once made, are to be complied with.
B. Layoff Problems
The provision found in so many collective bargaining contracts
requiring advance notice of a layoff serves a somewhat different pur-
pose than the similar provision related to disciplinary action. The
employee who is about to be laid off wants to know about it not so
much in order to talk the company out of it, for so long as his senior-
ity is respected he has little possibility of this. Rather, he wants to
know as much in advance of a layoff as possible so that he may ad-
just his private plans to his change in status. Thus the notice of
layoff becomes a part of the substance of the transaction. Moreover,
in the normal layoff the company is able to plan ahead and it does
not resist the idea of advance notice. The tensions which are invoked
in disciplinary and discharge cases are not involved. The exception
to this, of course, is the layoff which is occasioned by an emergency
beyond the control of the company.
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the cases almost
universally hold that where the company has violated the notice
provisions of the layoff procedure liability is incurred. The difficult
cases have been those in which the sudden layoff is beyond the control
of the company and it seeks relief from the notice provisions of the
contract. Even in such situations if the notice provision of the
contract is unqualified, arbitrators have usually held that it is bind-
ing despite the company's inability to do anything about the cause
of the shutdown.26 Sometimes a modified result is attained by apply-
ing principles of contract law under the doctrine of impossibility.27
Thus the company is excused from performance to the extent to which
26. E.g., Greer Hydraulics, Inc., 29 Lab. Arb. 706 (1957).
27. 6 Williston, Contracts, § 1956 (Rev. ed. 1938).
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performance is genuinely impossible, but not therafter. Part of the
period of notice may then be excused without waiving the entire
requirement. Some contracts recognize the problem and take care
of it in that fashion.
C. Promotions
Promotion cases often involve a different kind of problem in pro-
cedural regularity. The discipline and layoff cases tend to involve
specific contractual requirements which have, for one reason or
another, not been met. Promotion cases, on the other hand, often
involve only a general standard with the question then being one of
whether the procedure which the company utilized in complying with
that standard was "fair." Obviously this gives the arbitrator much
greater latitude for the application of his own views, for he is then
faced not only with assessing the importance of compliance with a
given standard, but deciding what the standard is in the first place.
Illustrative cases in this area are frequently found in the telephone
industry. A typical contract clause will provide that in selecting
employees for promotion the company "shall adhere to the principle
that seniority shall govern if all other qualifications of the individuals
being considered are determined by the company to be substantially
equal." The decision of the company is then final unless it is shown
to have acted "arbitrarily or in bad faith."
Under one such clause an arbitrator held, in 1951, that the clause
had been violated because company supervisors, in evaluating ap-
plicants, read "substantially equal" to mean "exactly equal." 2 Fol-
lowing this decision the company installed an elaborate system for
evaluating applicants so that the same error could not happen again.
But in a subsequent case an arbitrator held that the company had
not followed its own system with the end result that its action had
been "arbitrary."29 In another telephone company case almost ex-
actly the same sequence of events took place.30 A similar situation,
outside the telephone industry, involved a contract which provided
that in cases of transfers, promotions and increases or decreases of
the working force, length of service, ability, skill and efficiency and
physical fitness should be considered. Seniority would then govern
if employees had the "necessary" ability, skill, efficiency and physical
fitness. In choosing employees for certain vacancies the company
utilized a battery of tests developed at its request by a university
28. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 1 (1951).
29. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 8 Am. Lab. Arb. Awards
# 70,335 (1957).
30. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 256 (1955).
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research agency. The arbitrator thought it was improper for the
company to rely on these tests to the exclusion of all other factors
because: "Those attributes are in point only to the extent of establish-
ing a standard of satisfactory capacity for such employees as can
achieve it, and from there seniority prevails."'z Thus any attempt to
follow the test to the exclusion of seniority was improper. And in a
situation in which the company agreed to promote men in accordance
with their seniority, provided the employee had the aptitude, ability
and efficiency to handle the job, the arbitrator held that it could not
automatically eliminate from consideration an applicant who did not
have a high school education, though it could consider this insofar as
such a factor could be shown to be relevant.32
In short, where the parties have agreed to a general standard, arbi-
trators have not been reluctant to inquire into the procedures by
which such general standards are effectuated. And insofar as such
procedures are capricious, or may lead to unfair results, they have
been rejected. Such a conclusion, incidentally, often leads the arbi-
trator into an even more difficult question-that of the proper remedy
-which is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. The arbitrator
may get into the case in the first place because a rejected applicant,
usually having greater seniority than the successful bidder, grieves.
At the hearing the evidence may show that the procedure used in
choosing the employee for the vacancy was defective, but it may
furnish no basis whatsoever for deciding whether the grievant would
be qualified if a proper procedure had been utilized. The hearing
may, on the other hand, disclose that the grievant is not qualified.
To simply declare the job open, as is sometimes done,33 may be less
than satisfactory because commitments have been made which will
lead to the suspicion that the same result will ultimately be reached
after a new and ostensibly fair proceeding. To promote an unqualified
man will be to ignore the contract, and also to expose to possible
discharge a man who is not competent to do the work. In situations
of this kind arbitrators have sometimes sought a compromise under
which the party which has failed to comply with the proper procedure
is penalized without upsetting the substantive action which has been
taken .'
D. Conclusions
If there is any basis for the claim that arbitrators have violated
the fundamental rules of fairness by failing to respect procedural
31. Ball Brothers Co., Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 353, 356 (1956).
32. Union Oil Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 62 (1951).
33. Sandvik Steel, Inc., 29 Lab. Arb. 747 (1957).
34. A. 0. Smith Corp., 9 Am. Lab. Arb. Awards # 70,970 (1959).
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requirements of the contract, it is not apparent from the reported
cases. As a matter of fact, quite the contrary seems to be the case.
Arbitrators often go considerably beyond the requirements of fair
play. Exactly why they do so is not always clear. Sometimes non-
compliance may be simply a convenient peg on which to hang a
decision which may otherwise appeal to the arbitrator but which he
is having difficulty rationalizing. At other times the decision may
represent a value judgment on the part of the arbitrator that it will
be "good" for the parties to adhere strictly to their agreement. To
the extent that it represents the latter the arbitrator has gone beyond
his immediate function of umpiring the dispute and imposed some-
thing of his own philosophy on the parties. In any event, there is a
higher degree of uniformity in the way arbitrators treat procedural
irregularities which occur before the hearing than there is those
which occur either at or after the hearing, as we shall now see.
II. THE HEARING STAGE
Every experienced arbitrator has faced a puzzling series of ques-
tions arising out of the presentation of alleged new issues, new argu-
ments and new evidence at the hearing stage. These issues, arguments
and evidence are characterized as "new," of course, because they have
not been presented at the previous stages in the grievance procedure.
Examples of this situation are readily available. B is discharged for
the violation of a safety rule, but at the hearing the company wants
to show "unsatisfactory work performance," though it has not
previously argued this.35 C is discharged for excessive absenteeism,
and the company now wants to show, for the first time, that there are
other valid grounds for the discharge3 D is discharged for starting
a civil action against the company, but the latter now wants to show
that he has committed a theft.37 E is discharged for insubordination,
but the company now wants to show that he once punched out for
two other employees, contrary to company rules 3 8 In a rate dispute
in which the union has contended for a given classification, it now
wants the arbitrator, if he finds the requested classification inappro-
priate, to choose a classification which has not been previously dis-
cussed.39 In a union jurisdictional dispute one party attempts for the
first time to show that the other is engaged in a boycott, though this
35. West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., 10 Lab. Arb. 117 (1947).
36. International Shoe Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 941 (1947).
37. Dow Chemical Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 71 (1958).
38. Forest Hill Foundry Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 153 (1946).
39. Chrysler Corp. and United Auto Workers, 1 Am. Lab. Arb. Awards #
67,258 (1944).
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is not a part of the charge which has brought the matter before the
umpire.40
Whenever a situation like those cited above arises two basic, but
quite separate, questions arise. The first is one of procedure, the
second one of policy. This difference in the nature of the two ques-
tions gives rise, in turn, to a subsidiary question, namely, should
arbitrators confine themselves to procedural questions and avoid those
which involve industrial relations policy? None of these questions
can be satisfactorily answered without exploring, by case example,
the nature of the terms "procedure" and "policy," and then the
institutional framework within which labor arbitration takes place.
When a company discharges X for violating a safety rule, and then
wants to show at the hearing that he has an unsatisfactorly work
record, a number of procedural questions will immediately occur to
the arbitrator. Is the union prepared to meet this new charge, or may
it legitimately claim "surprise?" If the union is surprised should the
hearing be adjourned in order that it may adequately prepare its
case? Has the employee been prejudiced in any way by the company's
delay in bringing forth this new charge? In view of the seriousness
of the discharge penalty is there an analogy to the law of criminal
pleading in which there ".... is a rule that on an indictment charging
only a single offence the issue must be confined to that offence, and no
election is allowed to lay before the jury a number of such offences
from which they are to select the one best proved ?"41
Quite obviously the arbitrator is competent to, and indeed must,
answer the above questions if the arbitration hearing is to be fair.
But there are other questions which he may, or may not, answer
which more nearly relate to "policy" than to "procedure." If the par-
ties are allowed to introduce "new" material at the arbitration stage
(even assuming this can be done under conditions which will fully pro-
tect the procedural rights of the other party) will this tend to under-
mine the whole grievance procedure of which arbitration is but the
final step? And if it will tend to do this, should the arbitrator rule that
no "new" material may be presented because this will be "bad" for the
system of industrial jurisprudence which the parties are supposed
to be developing in the plant? Or should the arbitrator take the posi-
tion that the nature of the relationship between the parties is none
of his business, and that the only questions which he need answer with
respect to any alleged new material relate to whether either party will
be prejudiced in terms of a fair hearing?
If the institution known as labor arbitration could be made to fit
40. IUE v. Sheet Metal Workers, 33 Lab. Arb. 512 (1959).
41. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 194, at 651 (3d ed. 1940).
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within a single mold, the question of the appropriate role of the
arbitrator in deciding questions of "procedure" or "policy" could at
least be wisely debated. But because labor arbitration does not fit a
single model the debate is immeasurably more complicated. One can
easily tick-off several varieties of arbitration situations:
1. The well-established, sophisticated umpire system in which the
grievance steps are well handled, and the parties firmly believe that
every effort should be made to settle the matter before it is referred
to arbitration.42
2. The well-established umpire system in which the parties never-
theless believe in giving their umpire wide latitude to proceeed on his
own.
43
3. The ad hoc case in which the parties are sophisticated but where,
for one reason or another, one party has chosen to withhold a key
portion of its evidence.44
4. The ad hoc situation in which one or both parties procures coun-
sel at the arbitration level, and where for the first time a systematic
investigation and organization of the evidence is provided.
5. The ad hoc situation in which the parties have not procured
counsel and where one or both are rank neophytes at arbitration, so
that they have made little or no effort to organize the evidence prior
to the hearing, and where the arbitrator must himself take over much
of the examination.
6. The case in which the relationship between the parties is so bad
or so suspicious that they make no real effort to resolve grievances
prior to arbitration, and much of the time at the arbitration hearing
may be spent in trying to ascertain the issues which are to be tried.
These are, of course, not the only situations which can arise, but
they are familiar ones and they illustrate the point that there is no
common denominator in the labor arbitration field. Moreover, the
contract itself may control the introduction of new issues, or new
evidence at the hearing stage. -Thus any meaningful analysis of
decisions handed down by arbitrators becomes difficult. Nevertheless
an analysis may shed some further light on what arbitrators are
doing in these kinds of cases and why.
Starting at the far end of the spectrum, it is common practice to
deny to either party the right to present and argue an entirely new
42. Alexander, Impartial Umpireships: The General Motors-UAW Experi-
ence, Arbitration and the Law, in Proceedings, 12th Annual Meeting, Nat'l
Academy of Arbitrators 108 (1959).
43. E.g., The agreement between the Ford Motor Co. and the UAW-AFL-CIO
states in Article VII, Sec. 13 (b), that: "The Umpire may make such investiga-
tion as he may deem proper ......
44. Texas Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 735 (1947).
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grievance, even though the grievance has some episodical relationship
with the issue before the arbitrator. Thus where the original
grievance complained about the employer's method of reducing his
work force, the union was not permitted to argue claims related to
recall or alleged denial of free transportation rights since no separate
grievances had ever been filed on those subjects.45 Even in this kind
of situation, however, the new claim would probably be heard in the
absence of any objection from the company. As was pointed out
earlier, there are situations in which the parties literally make it a
practice to define the issues at the arbitration hearing, and in which
they then proceed upon the basis of the issues as defined. This may
very well mean that such differences have never been discussed in any
meaningful fashion in the grievance procedure. Under an umpire
system new claims of this kind would be quite unlikely to end up
before the umpire without any previous discussion between the par-
ties. But in the ad hoc type of case the arbitrator has almost no oppor-
tunity to influence the development of a sound grievance procedure.
A much more frequent situation involves the kind of case in which
the basic issue remains the same--"Was X discharged for just
cause ?"-but the rationale or the evidence changes. There are many
decisions, particularly in discipline and discharge cases, in which it
has been held that the company is bound by whatever reasons were
given for the discharge at the time it was invoked, and may not
thereafter rely upon other grounds. This is so even though the
additional grounds which are now stated can be proved and if
proved would probably have justified an otherwise unjustifiable
action. 46 There is, however, at least one decision in which the arbi-
trator held that the evidence was insufficient to support a discharge
on grounds of excessive absenteeism and that other reasons subse-
quently given could not be considered, but nevertheless denied back
pay because of the additional reasons for the discharge which were
advanced at the hearing.47 Some of the cases in which the company is
limited to the reasons originally given for the discharge can be
traced directly to contract language. It may require that the company
notify the union of all reasons for the discharge at the time the action
is taken.48 Or it may simply require that before discharge an employee
be given a written statement of the reasons for the discharge. 9 In
either case the arbitrator need only rely upon the contract for his
45. American Airlines, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 448 (1956).
46. Chrysler and United Auto Workers, 1 Am. Lab. Arb. Awards # 67,021
(1945).
47. International Shoe Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 941 (1947).
48. Forest Hill Foundry Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 153 (1946).
49. Bethlehem Steel Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 635 (1957).
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ruling that additional reasons for the discharge are not admissible at
the arbitration hearing. There are other cases in which a similar
result is reached but in which less reliance is placed upon the strict
language of the contract. In such cases it is often frankly stated that
to permit new grounds for past action to be stated at the arbitration
hearing will undermine the grievance procedure,50 and "void the good
results which may be expected in the preliminary steps of a well
functioning grievance system.' 's1
It appears correct to conclude from the above cases, and others like
them, that arbitrators believe it is unwise to permit new charges not
previously advanced in the course of the grievance procedure, to be
advanced at the hearing. But one must not assume from this that any
such universal rule is invoked. As has been pointed out, the official
rationale for such a holding often is that the contract does not permit
it. Thus the arbitrator is not imposing his views of what is "wise"
upon the parties, he is simply applying a contractual agreement.
Many of the cases in which the contract does not require such a
restriction involve umpire situations in which the umpire, usually
with the full approval of the parties, is attempting to develop a
system of grievance handling which will maximize the responsibility
of the parties2z There are, on the other hand, countless ad hoc
situations in which the issues are never defined with any care prior
to the arbitration hearing, and in which the arbitrator's sole concern
is likely to be one of conducting a fair hearing in the sense that both
parties are aware of the issue to be tried and have had an opportunity
to prepare for it. In this kind of a proceeding there is usually little
question of outlawing a given charge, but only of giving the other
side adequate opportunity to prepare to meet it.
A somewhat different question is raised when the problem is not one
of a new charge, but rather of new evidence relating to the same old
charge. Such evidence will ordinarily fall into one of two categories:
(1) newly discovered evidence; or (2) deliberately withheld evidence.
In either case the hybrid nature of the arbitration tribunal is exposed.
It is, in part, an appellate body-a court of last resort-for it
ordinarily considers an issue only after the parties have tried but
failed to resolve it. It is, on the other hand, akin to a trial tribunal, for
seldom do the parties make an all-out effort to marshall their re-
sources unless the case must be referred to arbitration.
Basically, new evidence (in either of the above categories) will
present the arbitrator with the same questions of procedure and policy
50. Dow Chemical Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 71 (1958).
51. Chrysler Corp. and United Auto Workers, 1 Am. Lab. Arb. Awards #
67,258 (1944).
52. Alexander, supra note 42, at 146.
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which have already been discussed. He will be concerned with
whether the new evidence so surprises the other party that a fair
hearing cannot be held without an adjournment with opportunity for
investigation and further preparation. And in the case of deliberately
withheld evidence he will have additional misgivings about the "wis-
dom" or the "ethics" of permitting the evidence to be introduced.
These misgivings will be accompanied by doubts as to the function
of the arbitrator in relation to such policy matters.
If the only problem is that in the course of preparing its case for
arbitration one side or the other has developed some new arguments,
not previously used in the prior steps of the grievance procedure, few
arbitrators are likely to find any serious question as to the receipt of
the argument. As one arbitrator said:
At the hearing the Union departed somewhat from these [past]
arguments and added some additional arguments. The Chairman
does not believe that the new contentions raised by the Union at
the hearing should be barred for the reason that they were not
presented during the preliminary discussions in the grievance
procedure, although the Company contends otherwise. When
cases reach the last step in the grievance machinery, consisting
of arbitration, it is common practice for them to be reviewed and
more thoroughly prepared than they had been prior to that time.
Contentions which do not change the facts or the issue, it appears
to the Chairman, should always be available to the parties. A
different situation is presented where important facts, as dis-
tinguished from arguments, may have been withheld during the
earlier steps of the grievance machinery or where, as often
occurs, an attempt is made to broaden the scope of the grievance
for the first time in arbitration. Such, however, is not the case
here.53
The fact that new evidence, not previously presented in the
grievance procedure, is being presented does not cause its disbarment
by all arbitrators. In one such case the contract provided that in
discharge cases the parties should have a meeting at which "the facts
concerning the case shall be made available to both parties." Subse-
quently, in arbitration, the union contended that the arbitration
board was limited in its consideration to those items of fact presented
by the company at the original meeting. The board rejected this view,
saying:
The only reasonable interpretation that can be made of this
sentence is that each party on the request of the other party
must make available what facts it has on the case at the time.
. . . There is obviously nothing in the given sentence . . . that
53. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 707, 708 (1950).
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precludes either party from introducing subsequently in the
grievance steps or in the arbitration facts other than those pre-
sented in the suspension hearing.... Certainly the union, on be-
half of a disciplined employee who believes that he has been
unfairly dealt with, should not have foreclosed to it the right
to present additional evidence that might be used to sustain
the innocence of the employee. Similarly, the company must be
recognized as not being deprived of the right to introduce addi-
tional evidence prior to final adjudication to sustain its charges
against the employee. These respective rights of the parties are
commonly recognized in judicial proceedings. The labor agree-
ment of the parties does not set aside these rights.5 4
While the above decision did not limit the evidence at the arbitra-
tion hearing to that which was presented at the original grievance
hearing, it did imply that the parties were under a mutual obligation
to disclose to each other facts then in their possession. Another
arbitrator appeared to open the door even wider for the receipt of
new evidence. When the employee was discharged for incompetence,
the union argued that the company did not, at the preliminary hearing
between the parties, present the evidence which it later submitted to
the arbitrator to prove unsatisfactory work performance, and that
this evidence should therefore not be considered. The arbitrator
simply replied that "the contract... does not restrict the Umpire to
consideration of only factual evidence submitted at the first stage, or
any earlier stage. .. "5
Perhaps the most difficult question is whether evidence which is
deliberately withheld at the earlier stages of the grievance procedure
may be barred on that ground when the arbitration is held. On this
arbitrators appear to hold quite different views. The case for barring
such evidence is set forth in the following extract:
Arbitration is merely a method for determining a pre-existing
dispute which the parties have been unable to settle in the prior
steps of the grievance machinery. The arbitration hearing is not
the place for presentation of new claims, although the more
thorough investigation which precedes arbitration often results
in the discovery of evidence not theretofore known and of argu-
ments not theretofore conceived. The essential facts supporting
the claim of the Union should be revealed in the earlier steps of
the grievance machinery if such facts are known to the Union.
In the absence of such revelation, the entire purpose of the
grievance machinery remains unfulfilled, and the possibilities of
settlement are lost. The same, of course, is true with regard to
the company's claims and existing evidence in its favor. If such
54. American Steel & Wire Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 193, 206 (1946).
55. Carbon Fuel Co., 1 Am. Lab. Arb. Awards # 67,327 (1946).
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evidence is not made known by one side to the other it may not be
accepted for the first time in arbitration. 6
The opposite view, namely, that the only serious question when
such evidence is presented is one of "surprise," is set forth in another
case:
The Union has complained that the Company did not furnish
it "all information in its possession necessary to a full under-
standing of the subject matter of the complaint," as required by
Article XIV of the contract. However, all such information was
presented at the hearing, and the Union was allowed ten days,
the time it asked, to consider it. That the information must be
furnished at an earlier stage of grievance proceedings is not
evident from the language of the contract, which only states that
the Company will furnish the information "to the representative
of the employee and/or Board of Review." The purpose appears
to be to make sure that the representative and the Board shall
have the information in time for full consideration of it; and this
was so in the present instance.57
Something of a compromise between the above positions was struck
by a third arbitrator who justified the admission of deliberately
withheld evidence at the arbitration hearing on the ground that the
union had contributed to the "adversary" atmosphere in which the
parties conducted their affairs, and could not therefore complain about
the end results."8
Conclusions
Both the reported cases and discussions with arbitrators indicate
a wide disparity in the way they handle problems of new issues, new
evidence and new arguments presented for the first time at the
arbitration hearing. However, an important caveat must be entered
immediately. Differences among arbitrators on these questions may
be more theoretical than real. The lack of a single model for the
arbitration process confuses the question. If one prefaces his ques-
tion as to the handling of new material by stating the context within
which the question arises, e.g., a large corporation with a well
established umpire system, the answers are much more likely to be
uniform than if the question is put in the abstract. Moreover, it is
clear that in any context there is no significant difference among
arbitrators as to the necessity for insisting upon procedural safe-
56. Bethlehem Steel Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 366, 367 (1951).
57. Texas Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 735, 739 (1947).
58. Bethlehem Steel Co., 6 Lab. Arb. 617 (1947).
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guards in the way of adjournment, further investigation, etc., which
will insure the integrity and fairness of the hearing.
The one area in which there appears to be a genuine split among
arbitrators relates to the matter of referring the controversy back to
the parties when any new material appears upon the scene. Some
arbitrators feel strongly that the arbitration process must never be-
come in any way a substitute for the grievance machinery and collec-
tive bargaining in general. Thus in their view the proper ruling
when new issues, evidence or arguments are presented is to refer the
matter back to the parties on the theory that since they have not
considered the new materials, they have not exhausted the possi-
bilities of agreement and arbitration should not proceed until they
have. To do otherwise, they point out, is to undermine the collective
bargaining potential between the parties and make a mockery of the
grievance machinery. Other arbitrators would say that this approach
is probably desirable within the context of an established umpire
system, but that it is wholly unrealistic in the typical ad hoc situation.
It is true that the two cases are not quite comparable. In the umpire
situation the arbitrator has a continuing stake in the whole grievance
pattern. His long run success, as well as his tenure, may depend in
large part on his success in persuading the parties to resolve most of
their own difficulties. This point of view is likely to be buttressed by
the more careful thought which the parties have given to their
umpire system and to the ultimate objectives which they hope to
achieve through it. One of those objectives will almost certainly be
to resolve their own grievances insofar as this is possible. The likely
result is a high degree of co-operation between the umpire and the
parties toward the ultimate end of exhausting the possibilities of
settlement before cases are referred to the umpire for decision. The
institutional factors which are operative in the ad hoc case tend to
exert a pressure in exactly the opposite direction. Even if he has
previously arbitrated for the parties, the ad hoe arbitrator may
know less about the relationship than does the umpire, and certainly
has less control over it. He comes into the case with very little
information. If material is presented at the hearing which one party
contends is entirely new, the arbitrator's concern is much more likely
to be with the procedural problem of giving the other side a fair
opportunity to meet the new material than it is with the impact which
proceeding further will have on the collective bargaining relationship
between the parties. Moreover, the parties themselves are likely to
resent "meddling" with their affairs in terms of any advice he may
render on the development of "sound" labor relations. They may
suggest that they have hired him to render a decision, not to give
them gratuitous advice.
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Rigid insistence upon a given pattern to be followed in the event
new material is offered at the arbitration hearing would seem to be
a mistake. The flexibility which has been a principal virtue of the
arbitration system would be thereby diminished. Whether the issue
should be referred back to the parties when something new emerges
is essentially a policy question. The answer depends so much on the
context within which the question arises that no uniform answer is
either possible or desirable. However, if one views the question of
new material solely from the vantage point of the fair process and
procedure, it would seem that three questions should then be asked:
1. Is the issue, the evidence, or the argument which is now being
raised genuinely new in the sense that the parties have not previously
been aware of it?
2. If it is new, will its admission in any way prejudice the position
of the other party, or is it purely incidental to the basic issue in the
case?
3. If it is new, and if it will be prejudicial to the interest of the
other party, what procedural steps should be taken to protect the
interest of the surprised party?
There are some issues which arise on the arbitration hearing which
evoke the response of "surprise," which hardly qualify for that label.
Assuming there is genuine surprise injected at the hearing, it may
nevertheless not prejudice the case. New corroborative witnesses,
for example, may add nothing to the principal case, and the other
party may be fully protected through his right to cross examination.
If there is real surprise, and if prejudice will result, some way must
be found to give the other party an opportunity to meet the new
situation. Many arbitrators apparently accept the evidence, but then
give the opposing party an opportunity to investigate and request a
further hearing.
There are no reported cases which have come to our attention, nor
have discussions with arbitrators revealed any complaint by the
parties that they have been denied a fair hearing because of surprise
evidence. They may differ as to its admissibility, they may
strenuously argue the effect of such a procedure on the grievance
machinery, and they may deplore the ethics of the party which has
deliberately withheld evidence, but there is no evidence that they feel
that the procedural steps which arbitrators have taken to protect
their rights to respond to surprise materials have been less than
satisfactory.
III. THE POST-HEARING STAGE
Logically, the problem of new evidence after the record has been
closed should not give rise to any particular difficulty and, in fact,
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it rarely does. No evidence contained in a post-hearing brief will be
considered if it was not presented at the hearing. If, on the other
hand, one of the parties advances a legitimate reason for re-opening
the hearing in order to introduce new evidence not available at the
time of the hearing, the request will usually be granted. The circum-
stances of the individual case will control the ruling, but if one
assumes that the request is in good faith and not for the purpose of
unduly lengthening the hearing, most arbitrators will doubtless agree
to reconvene for the purpose of receiving the evidence. 9
The difficulty at the post-hearing stage is not with evidence but with
argument. The arbitrator may sit down to consider a case only to find
that one of the briefs contains an argument which was not advanced
in the hearing or at any of the steps of the grievance procedure. Or,
in the course of studying the record, the arbitrator may find that he
is himself gradually evolving a new theory which neatly resolves the
dispute but which is new to both of the parties. What then? If the
arguments are based upon the evidence which is in the record is there
any reason why the parties or the arbitrator should be restricted in
any fashion in arguing any theory that occurs to them for purposes
of reaching a decision? Perhaps this is a question which ought not to
be answered without first testing it against some of the case problems
which arise.
In an industrial plant making packaging products one department
handled the necessary printing. Apprentices regularly worked with
the journeymen so that a supply of trained men would be available if
and when expanded operations became necessary. At the outset of the
training program the apprentices had simply worked along with the
journeymen during their regular hours. Then the company decided
that it would be more efficient to permit the apprentices to continue
to operate the machines during the half-hour lunch periods of the
regular operators, and to take their own lunch periods after the opera-
tors were back on the job. When this change was ordered the union
promptly grieved, claiming in the alternative that the apprentices
were either entitled to journeymen's pay for the half-hour period, or
that the journeymen were entitled to an additional half-hour's pay
since they "owned" the machines to which the apprentices were
assigned. The dispute between the parties over this issue was referred
to arbitration after they were unable to agree and the hearing fol-
lowed along the lines indicated. In its brief the union, for the first
time, advanced an argument which, while related to its original
contention and based upon the evidence in the record, had not pre-
59. See Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules, American Arbitration Ass'n,
Rule 32.
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viously been made. It asserted that the journeymen were entitled to
the extra half-hour's pay because, though they did not work during
this period, they were held responsible for the work of the apprentice,
and if it was in any way defective, the blame was placed upon the
journeymen. There was, indeed, evidence in the record that the
journeymen were held responsible for the work of their apprentices
during the lunch hour in that the mark of the journeyman appeared
upon each piece of work done on his machine so that defects could
be traced back to their point of origin.
What should the arbitrator do about the "new" argument in the
above case? Since the brief was in the hands of the company and it
had made no comment upon the union's shift in tactics, should the ar-
bitrator be concerned? Is there any obligation on the part of the
arbitrator to ask for comment by the company? Is there anything
unfair about considering a new argument, particularly when the other
party is made aware through receiving a copy of the brief that it is
being advanced?
If the above case seems easy, take another one of somewhat
different dimensions. The issue is a discharge, and the contract
contains a clause which states, "In support of any suspension or dis-
charge the company shall not rely on past disciplinary actions occur-
ring prior to the preceding twelve-month period. .. "
The issue involves the alleged insubordination of the grievant and
the testimony is flatly contradictory. Barred from introducing the
grievant's past disciplinary record by the clause in the contract, the
company nevertheless includes in its brief a photostatic copy of his
personnel record, stating that it does so not to support the discharge
but only to aid the arbitrator in weighing the reliability of the various
witnesses. Is it possible to conclude that the disciplinary record
contained in the brief is only "argument" and not evidence? Can the
union claim that the company has not only inserted evidence in its
brief, but that the evidence is barred by the contract? Can the arbi-
trator divest himself of any prejudice he may have acquired by
looking at the employee's personnel record?
Finally, can one reach any firm conclusions about how to handle a
new argument advanced in the brief by one of the parties without
considering the thorny problem of the case which is decided upon a
theory developed by the arbitrator but unknown to the parties?
There are not many reported cases which discuss these problems,
therefore one must rely more on discussions among arbitrators as to
their views.
The safest generalization about arbitrators' views on new argu-
ments advanced by the parties in their briefs is simply that the
problem arises with sufficient frequency so that some arbitrators have
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developed procedures which pretty well protect them from it. Thus
a leading Detroit arbitrator asks the parties at the end of the hearing
to state the grounds on which they will rely in their briefs so that
there can be no surprise. And one of the most experienced New York
arbitrators even suggests to the parties that they indicate before the
conclusion of the hearing what reported cases they will rely upon in
their briefs so that the other side may respond to this in the course
of its brief.
Absent any agreement about the use of new arguments in the brief,
there is little uniformity in the views of arbitrators as to how the
matter should be treated. One suspects that this diversity is more
apparent than real, for when faced with a given set of facts the
rulings might be quite consistent. Some arbitrators take the view
that there is nothing wrong with a new argument advanced in the
brief, and that as long as the other side receives a copy the arbitrator
is not even under any obligation to ask the second party to comment.
Other arbitrators feel that any time a substantial new argument is
advanced in the brief, comment from the other party should be re-
quested even if it has previously received a copy of the brief and made
no comment. Some arbitrators qualify either view by saying that it
"depends on the kind of case and the kind of argument which is
made." In every discussion of the issue the point is soon raised as to
whether there is any difference between a new argument raised by
one of the parties, and a new argument advanced by the arbitrator in
his decision. This, in turn, raises a question which needs to be ex-
plored further.
"Surprise" at the hands of the arbitrator-in the sense that his
decision is based upon grounds not argued by the parties-is largely
a phenomena of the ad hoc cases and the increased tendency towards
judicialization of the arbitration process. It could hardly have
happened in the clothing industry when William Leiserson was
umpiring, in the hosiery industry under George Taylor, or in the Ford
Motor Co. under Harry Shulman's tenure, because none of these
parties viewed the umpire as a circuit-riding judge who came into the
lives of the litigants simply to hear a given dispute and then depart
to render a decision. He was, on the contrary, an integral part of the
company-union relationship, he was free to go anywhere and talk to
anyone, and his decisions were expected to be based on much more
than just the information that might be given to him in connection
with the point at hand. In a substantial number of instances, the
decision was, in fact, a mediated result even if it did not show this on
its face. Under such a system there was little opportunity for the
arbitrator to shock the parties with an unexpected analysis because
his analysis had already been discussed with them. For different
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss3/2
LABOR ARBITRATION
reasons, much the same thing is true today of the umpire system in
General Motors and the United Auto Workers. There the parties
carefully screen their cases, present them to the umpire stripped of a
mediation context, bar new evidence or arguments not presented
earlier in the grievance procedure, and expect a decision based upon
their presentations. In other umpire situations, like United States
Steel, there is a board on which management and labor are both
represented. This insures a full discussion of the neutral chairman's
line of thought with the result, once again, that there is little chance
of surprising the parties.
If the umpire system offers little opportunity for surprise from the
arbitrator, the exact opposite is true of the ad hoe system. Usually
the arbitrator works alone, often finds himself confronted with a
woefully inadequate presentation of the case, and even in the well-
presented case has little opportunity to think it out and ask questions
which a later study of the record may convince him should have been
asked. In the process of writing his decision the arbitrator faces a
real dilemma. If he finds an unexpected contract clause which he
deems decisive, but which the parties have not argued, what should
he do? Reconvene the hearing? Ignore the clause? Write to the
parties and ask them if it is relevant? Assume that it is relevant and
base the decision thereon? Or suppose it isn't a new clause in the
contract, it is simply a new line of argument neglected by the parties
but amply justified by the evidence. Should it make any difference
that one side was less well represented than the other? Is it a proper
function of the arbitrator to come to the aid of one side if he believes
there is a decisive argument which has not been made?
Some case illustrations will highlight the above problems even more
sharply. In a steel mill a railroad dumper crew hauls raw material
within the company yards. The company finds that it is necessary to
weigh the cars of raw materials and installs a scale for this purpose.
Arguing that the duties so involved are of a minor nature it assigns
them to the conductor, and offers only to negotiate a new wage for
him. The union insists that the company is without the unilateral
right to assign duties, and requests that both the wage and the
assignment of the duties be negotiated. Both parties come to arbitra-
tion agreeing that there is no controlling clause in the contract, and
simply disputing the company's right to exercise its managerial
prerogative. In deciding the case the arbitrator comes to the conclu-
sion that the evidence supports a finding that the company knew of its
manning problems during the past negotiation, but did not discuss
them when the conductor's wage was being negotiated. Because of
this the arbitrator concludes that the company is now bound by the
previous job content unless and until the parties can agree upon a
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change. This is not an argument which the union made, but it is
based upon evidence in the record. Is it legitimate in that kind of a
case for the arbitrator to issue a decision based upon his own argu-
ment?
In a somewhat different type of case the company owned a ware-
house situated a few miles from the main plant. The warehouse was
leased from another owner who was responsible for its care and
maintenance. When painting was required the owner hired a non-
union contractor, thereby causing the painter's union to picket the
warehouse. Foreseeing the dilemma which this would pose for its
industrial union employees, the principal company gave part of its
employees the option of coming into the main plant to work until
the painters' dispute was resolved. At the same time it left a few of
the industrial employees at the warehouse. When they refused to
cross the picket line they were disciplined. Following their discipline
the employees grieved, claiming that the record of violence in the
community was such that they did not dare cross the picket line. The
arbitrator held with them, but not for the reason they gave. He
thought the company had violated a well known principle of industrial
jurisprudence to the effect that employees cannot be discriminatorily
treated. Thus when the company chose to remove some of the
employees from the scene of the picketing so that they would not be
faced with the problem of crossing the picket line, it could not expose
others to the same problem and then discipline them for refusing to
cross. This brought the following friendly, but tart, response from
the company:
We do not expect to receive an award on a position or argument
we have not made; nor do we anticipate that the arbitrator will
slide around the table and make the Union representatives' case
for them. We do believe the case decided by the arbitrator
should be the same case argued by the parties at the final local
level prior to arbitration-and not a new one conceived by him.00
Would it have been better if the arbitrator had stuck strictly to the
arguments presented by the parties in the above ease? Is there any
difference between applying what the arbitrator might allege to be a
well-known rule against discrimination which has become a part of
the common-law of industrial jurisprudence, and applying a wholly
new clause in the contract which the parties have not argued?
Perhaps the most troublesome case of all is the situation in which
the arbitrator comes across a clause in the contract which has not
been argued or even mentioned during the hearing, but which seems
to be decisive. Since the contract is invariably introduced as an
60. Letter from a company vice-president to the author, Feb. 1, 1960.
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exhibit there will be no problem of having a basis in the record for the
decision. Sometimes, of course, the problem can be avoided if the
arbitrator has time to scan the contract for relevant sections about
which he may then diplomatically inquire during the hearing.
An airline case, in which the company members of the board
dissented, furnishes a typical example of this type of case. A group of
pilots had been suspended for falsification of expense accounts, and
they grieved over the penalty assessed. Though finding the pilots
guilty of the offense charged, the chairman and the union board
members felt that the penalty was not binding on them because the
company had failed to conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accord-
ance with the negotiated rules of the agreement. To this the company
members gave the following spirited reply:
The undersigned specifically disagree with and dissent from the
findings and conclusions of the neutral members of the Board
with respect to the so-called faulty procedures followed by the
company. The undersigned further state that by those findings
the neutral member of the Board has given to portions of the
collective bargaining agreement.., a new meaning which in fact
does not appear in said agreement and which was never in-
tended....
Furthermore, the undersigned also state that the matter of pro-
cedure raised by the neutral member was not an issue in
this case and not subject to decision by the Board, and therefore
for that reason also outside of the jurisdiction of the Board.
We believe the record shows that none of the grieving pilots nor
their counsel ever raised the procedural issue discussed at
length by the neutral member, that this issue was only raised by
the neutral member himself, and was improperly made a part
of the case.6'
Some of the sharpest criticism of arbitrators who develop their own
theories or rely upon new clauses in deciding cases comes from people
who advocate a much more "judicial" approach to arbitration. Un-
aware of the furious debate which has raged down through the years
as to the proper function of a judge, they somehow assume that
"judicial" means that the arbitrator will hear the arguments of the
parties, retire to his quarters, strip his mind of all matters not
discussed however relevant they may appear to be, and then decide the
case. Perhaps this is the way it should be-both among arbitrators
and judges. In fact, courts, like arbitrators, often resort to their
own theories for resolving controversies. This is illustrated by the
controversial decision handed down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
within the past year involving labor arbitration. In that case a
61. Unpublished award furnished the author in confidence.
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dispute arose between the company and the union as to whether
certain production employees who had been promoted to supervision
and then returned to the production force continued to accrue
seniority. 2 An arbitrator held that they did not, in response to a
grievance filed by the employees who were bumped by the action of
the company in returning the supervisors to the bargaining unit.
The supervisors, who had neither been present at the hearing nor
given any direct notice of it (except insofar as they were now once
again members of the union) brought suit to enjoin enforcement of
the award on the sole ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his ju-
risdiction. Ignoring the basis of the complaint, the trial court never-
theless granted an injunction on the ground that the complainants had
been divested of property rights without due process of law. The
union appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court, and the plaintiff
moved for review of the action of the trial court in failing to make a
finding that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction although
such issue was raised by the complainant. The Supreme Court modi-
fied the trial court's opinion somewhat, but stuck to the position that
the plaintiffs were not bound by the award because of not having been
given proper notice of the arbitration hearing. It then brushed off
the original ground of the complaint, that the arbitrator had exceeded
his jurisdiction, by saying that it was unnecessary to decide in view
of the earlier conclusions. The end result was that the only issue
which the plaintiffs had ever themselves raised was left unanswered,
though they "won" the decision.
No lawyer will suppose that the Hein-Werner case is in any sense
atypical. Judges have from time immemorial departed from the
arguments of counsel to decide cases, despite Mr. Justice Cardozo's
classic admonition that the judge is not ".... a knight-errant, roaming
at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness."0 3 Some
judges, like Charles Wyzanski, Jr., have freely discussed the role of
the trial judge in various types of cases. Speaking of antitrust cases
in which the question was what has been the custom of the market
and what would be the consequences of a judicial decree altering those
practices, he notes that the judge "is faced with the problem of
determining either the appropriate standard of fair competition in
trademarks or the appropriate standard for fiduciaries." 4 Counsel
sometimes fail to offer relevant material and the judge then reaches
his result partly on the basis of general information and partly on the
62. Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
63. Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process, 141 (1928).
64. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1295 (1952).
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basis of his studies in a library. Judge Wyzanski then goes on to
observe:
This tendency of a court to inform itself has increased in recent
years following the lead of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Not merely in constitutional controversies and in statu-
tory interpretation, but also in formulation of judge-made rules
of law, the justices have resorted, in footnotes and elsewhere,
to references drawn from legislative hearings, studies by execu-
tive departments, and scholarly monographs. Such resort is
sometimes defended as an extension of Mr. Brandeis' technique
as counsel for the state in Muller v. Oregon. In Muller's case,
however, Mr. Brandeis' object was to demonstrate that there was
a body of informed public opinion which supported the reason-
ableness of the legislative rule of law. But in cases of which I
am speaking these extra-judicial studies are drawn upon to
determine what would be a reasonable judicial rule of law. Thus
the focus of the inquiry becomes not what judgment is per-
missible, but what judgment is sound. And here it seems to me
that the judge, before deriving any conclusions from any such
extra-judicial document or information, should lay it before the
parties for their criticism.
How this criticism should be offered is itself a problem not free
from difficulty. In some situations, the better course may be to
submit the material for examination, cross-examination and
rebuttal evidence. In others, where expert criticism has primarily
an argumentative character, it can be received better from the
counsel table and from briefs than from the witness box. The
important point is that before a judge acts upon a consideration
of any kind, he ought to give the parties a chance to meet it.
This opportunity is owed as a matter of fairness and also to
prevent an egregious error. 5
Insofar as one pursues the analogy between judges and arbitrator
it should be noted that there are at least three important points of
difference. The judge is clearly a public official, and his judicial
responsibilities extend beyond the problem of the parties. The arbi-
trator is a private umpire whose responsibilities relate much more
sharply to the parties who employ him. The judge is frankly bound
by precedent, while the arbitrator says he is not. Insofar as a judge
decides a case in line with a clear precedent he can hardly be said to
have surprised the parties, even if they neglect to point out the
precedent to him. Finally, judicial rules provide for a rehearing
even before courts of last resort, while the arbitrator's decision
becomes final once he signs it. Courts have been known to change
their minds on rehearing but this possibility does not ordinarily even
exist for the arbitrator. In this sense the arbitrator who departs
65. Ibid.
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on a path of his own runs the risk of doing greater damage to the
parties than does that judge, for the parties can ask for an oppor-
tunity to show the judge that he was wrong. This advantage in the
judicial system may be in part offset by the fact that private parties
can, on receipt of a privately issued arbitration award, themselves
agree to discard it and arrive at another solution which is more to
their liking.
Conclusions
Post-hearing procedural problems are, as we have seen, largely
confined to the ad hoc arbitration cases. And insofar as one party
surprises the other-that is, catches him unprepared-the problem
is invariably resolved by an appropriate procedure which gives the
other party time to prepare. There are, however, two difficult and
unresolved policy problems in such cases. One is the extent to which
arbitrators should insist that nothing new be brought to the arbitra-
tion table that has not been presented before, on the ground that to do
so undermines the collective bargaining process. The other is the
attitude which arbitrators should take towards deliberately withheld
evidence. The ambivalence of arbitrators about these questions is
probably attributable to the lack of an agreed theory as to the role
which the arbitrator is expected to play. If he is the mere agent of the
parties, hired simply to give his expert judgment as to the merits of a
dispute as it is presented to him, he need have no concern for the wis-
dom of the practices which the parties are pursuing. His sole objec-
tive will then be to see that the surprised party is given a fair
opportunity to answer something which may be new to him. If, on
the other hand, the arbitrator is something more than a mere agent
of the parties, he may have a legitimate concern with the develop-
ment of the bargaining relationship.
Some of this same ambivalence shows up when one approaches the
question of the use by arbitrators of their own undiscussed theories
to resolve cases before them, or the application of unargued contract
clauses. Few, if any, arbitrators would probably be willing to give up
the "arbitrator's prerogative" of using his best judgment as to' how
to resolve the case provided only that he stays within the limits of his
jurisdiction. It is doubtless true that in taking this position most
experienced arbitrators have been burned, and thus grown cautious,
about the practice. It is reasonable to suppose that with the passage
of time, and the growing sophistication of the parties in the field of
arbitration, arbitrators will, and should, resort less and less to their
own unargued theories or to new contract clauses for resolving cases
without first discussing them with the parties. There is, at least from
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the point of view of the parties, a basic question of fairness involved
and some of their resentment toward arbitrators on this score is no
doubt justified.
Until we evolve an accepted theory as to the role of the arbitrator
we will not resolve questions as to how he should deal with policy
matters, or the exercise of his own unreserved judgment. In this
connection we would do well to reflect on the relative recency of
industrial arbitration. It is essentially a post-World War II phe-
nomenon. A large percentage of the active arbitrators got their basic
training working in the mediation context of the War Labor Board.
Many of them, and other non-War Labor Board arbitrators, are
college professors who teach in the field of industrial relations.
Given these facts it is not surprising that few arbitrators have been
willing to accept a completely passive role in which they do nothing
but resolve disputes on the terms presented without ever inserting
their own ideas. It should also be noted that the development of a "rule
of law" within the plant is in substantial part due to the decisions
of arbitrators through which the parties have come to lay down and
accept regularized procedures governing their conduct. It may be
seriously doubted whether such a development could have taken place
had arbitrators not to a certain extent imposed their ideas of con-
structive labor relations on the parties.
In short, the mold within which the arbitrator is cast should not yet
be confined to a single production model. The context within which
cases come to arbitration is still too varied to make this a desirable
development. Standards of fairness are, with rare exceptions, being
met. The gray areas, which touch on the policy role of the arbitrator,
are not in such urgent need of clarification that they cannot be
allowed to continue to develop free of rigid rules.
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